Alexander Galkin – the King of Anti-Sanctions Schemes in Europe

As a former “colonel” involved in cash and raiding schemes in the Russian Federation, he rose to the rank of “general” in Latvia and the EU by organizing sanctioned deliveries and financing illicit schemes for prohibited imports, including military equipment used in “special operation Z” in Ukraine.

Meet Alexander Galkin, a little-known figure to the general public but highly influential in financial criminal circles—a black banker, forger, and raider who amassed his fortune in Russia through intentional bankruptcies of commercial banks.

Galkin began his career in Moscow as a simple construction worker. Later, he caught the attention of the notorious “authority” Kostya-Mogila, a ruthless killer and “thief-in-law” who gained nationwide notoriety in the 90s. According to one legend from the 90s, Kostya simply bought out Galkin for $300,000. Soon, Galkin quickly climbed the career ladder as an executor and frontman in numerous “shell” companies used by raiding gangs in Moscow and Leningrad at the time. It was then that our protagonist realized that it was more profitable not to rob kiosks and extort businessmen but to simply raid banks using fabricated “debts” and fake contracts.

At the peak of his criminal career in Russia, Alexander Galkin was the moderator of a scheme that stole over a billion dollars through the infamous “Moldovan scheme,” known worldwide. Money transit was handled by banks in Moscow, Chisinau, Kiev, and Riga, involving 122 “one-day” firms. Over one and a half years, 428 billion rubles passed through the accounts of these firms, all of which ended up in foreign banks.

The key role was played by the Moldovan bank Moldindconbank, with Latvian Trasta Komercbanka and nine Russian organizations also involved in the scheme.

We have a wealth of materials documenting this individual’s activities at our disposal. And it’s all because Galkin records absolutely everything he does: he records all his conversations with partners and even friends on camera or tape recorder.

And that’s what played a cruel joke on him. Part of his archive was leaked by his own comrades..

The Hungarian defence industry company Turday based in Budapest, to which Galkin transferred money, produces the following electronic equipment for the European military: drone interception systems (possibly for Ukrainian drones), secure communication lines on the battlefield, and surveillance cameras protected by special protocols.

According to the chart on page 2, this same company was used as a conduit for importing dual-use (read: military) American and Chinese electronic components into the EU.

Did you also notice the pipelines in the sphere of interests of the Hungarian company under Galkin’s control? It is not surprising, as there is written evidence of payments made by Galkin’s structures to Western equipment manufacturers for the oil industry. Below are the connections:

To reiterate, Galkin recorded everything, including audio recordings of conversations with his associates, in his personal archive. A digital copy of this archive was leaked by one of his employees. In the event of interest from law enforcement authorities in Latvia, the United Kingdom, and especially the United States (as dollar accounts were used for transactions), we are ready to share what we have.

Due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the Russian Ministry of Defense is desperately trying to replenish its supplies of electronic equipment that cannot be produced domestically. Galkin imported optics and modular military hospitals, where the injured soldiers from the “special operation Z” receive treatment. These military hospitals gained popularity during the COVID-19 pandemic in Moscow, for example.

The company is called Block CRS and is also present in the list of Galkin’s empire on page 2.

One of the largest customers in Russia is the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Izhmash,” which includes the renowned manufacturer of small arms, “Kalashnikov.” They are in great need of optical sights that are not produced in Russia and are difficult to officially import under the current circumstances.

Payments for grey import/black import were made through a complex network of intermediaries, a skill that Alexander Galkin mastered well in Moscow and proved very useful to him in Europe. Payments were made, including in US dollars. As it is known, any transaction, even one valued in dollars, is a legitimate target for investigation by the US Federal Reserve System.

Transportation from Europe to Russia was carried out through “gray” channels using Galkin’s contractors in Germany and the Russian Railways (RJD), another major partner of Galkin’s. This occurred despite the scandal surrounding the diversion of RJD budgets through the “laundromat” scheme previously described, which involved Moldova. Galkin also had a partner named Renato Usatyi, who held dual citizenship of Russia and Moldova.

How does he manage to do this under the toughest sanctions? And here is where his experience in illegal operations in Russia comes in handy, when numerous intermediary firms were used for raiding and money laundering abroad. So, let’s move on to the scheme of multiple companies associated with Alexander Galkin. The main management of these companies in Europe is conducted from Hong Kong, where our protagonist has registered at least three management companies.

One of the companies under Galkin’s control made a payment to an Indian company manufacturing rubber components for automobiles, as seen below. Another company based in Hong Kong, where Galkin’s main management companies are also located, exported microelectronics, as shown in the scheme. Due to the lack of imported components necessary for the production of dual-use goods, numerous structures in Europe, including those mentioned earlier under Galkin’s management, fill this market with unauthorized technology imports to Russia.

There are payments from Galkin to a German railway company called RTSB GmbH, which supplies goods to Russian Railways (RJD), another major client of Galkin’s parallel import activities. This company collaborates with RJD (Sanctions? No, they haven’t heard of them!) And every month, Galkin flies to London to obtain permission to continue the shipments from Mr. Usherovich, Boris Efimovich, another intriguing character. And after that, he flies to Cyprus, where the financiers of this very Usherovich are located, to refresh financial schemes with him.

This RTSB company has an interest in the Chinese project “Great Silk Road” through Russia. And miraculously, it is managed from London by a intermediary firm called CPR Group, also listed in Galkin’s scheme on page 10. And the Cypriot company Iliotropion (mentioned below) controls the import into Russia through Rolt Trading.

Alexander Galkin doesn’t shy away from the “good old” raiding practices, but now on the territory of the EU and the United Kingdom.

It’s astonishing that these actions have gone unpunished, for example, in London! To seize an entire bank, Monetley Ltd, which holds an English license, right under the nose of City regulators, through a controlled structure in Cyprus, which is part of the EU, leaves us bewildered… in good old England, no less?! Do the competent authorities in London know about this?

We are cross-checking the information about this case and will publish it in the continuation of this article after fact-checking. We also urge anyone affected by Alexander Galkin’s actions to share any additional information.